In this essay I hope to convey to the reader that some thirty years after Merleau-Ponty's death, his work remains relevant to important discussions today, particularly with regard to the philosophy of language. His work (along with Heidegger's, Wittgenstein's and Saussure's) has provided the starting point from which many current discussions of language depart. And yet his works remain under-represented in the current debates about the nature of language. As a remedy to this oversight, and in an effort to increase the circulation of Merleau-Ponty's relevant and significant views about language, I will provide a detailed exposition of and a comprehensive introduction to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language.

I will focus my exposition on two main texts, *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*. I do so because these texts represent two distinct periods in Merleau-Ponty's development: the early period of *Phenomenology of Perception* in which there are remnants of Cartesian subjectivism present in Merleau-Ponty's thought, and the later period of *The Visible and the Invisible* in which Merleau-Ponty makes a concerted and expressed effort to go beyond this subjectivism. This difference between the early and late work has led some to argue that there is a break in Merleau-Ponty's thought. Gary Madison, for example, argues that Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* leaves behind the concept of consciousness and intentionality (even operative, bodily intentionality) for ontology. Patrick Bourgeois, on the other hand, argues that Merleau-Ponty's late ontological studies, far from precluding the notion of (bodily) intentionality, actually presupposes, develops and integrates it into an ontological structure, making it an intentionality occurring within Being. J. Taminiaux, M. C. Dillon and T. F. Geraets as well provide convincing and to my mind conclusive arguments that Merleau-Ponty's work must be seen as a developing whole. It is therefore not my intention here to provide new arguments for the continuity thesis. Rather I will cast my exposition of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language around the convincing arguments that there is no break in Merleau-Ponty's thought, that the most fruitful way to read the difference between Merleau-Ponty's early and late texts is to see the late text as integrating bodily intentionality into an ontological framework. I will therefore attempt to show that a great deal of what is articulated in the *Phenomenology of Perception* about the general structure of language is preserved and restated in *The Visible and the Invisible*. It is clear however that there are differences. I will therefore provide a close textual analysis in order to show precisely what the similarities and differences are with
respect to Merleau-Ponty's theory of language.

An important reason why Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language will be considered in such depth is the influence his later views have on what I will refer to as skeptical hermeneutics - adopting and adapting the terminology of Nicholas Rescher. Skeptical hermeneutics follows insights developed by Merleau-Ponty in his late work, insights that led Merleau-Ponty to criticize his own earlier writings. In *The Visible and the Invisible* he criticizes his own notion of the tacit cogito as he had developed it in the *Phenomenology of Perception*. In the earlier work he sees the tacit cogito as presupposed by the "cogito arguments" expressed by Descartes. That is to say, beneath this reflective, linguistically expressed ego there is a tacit awareness or consciousness of oneself and of language. Descartes' reflective cogito, as it is expressed in words, means nothing without the underlying conscious awareness of oneself. But this is precisely what Merleau-Ponty comes to criticize in his later work: the notion of a "thought about thought" that is free of or prior to linguistic expression. First of all, this is impossible because thought (even implied or tacit) requires language. And secondly, the reduction to immanence is itself a product of language. Merleau-Ponty thus argues that there is no flow of positive significations that is offered to a positive reflecting subject. Add to this his later Saussurean insight that language is a system of differences and one comes very close to the position of skeptical hermeneutics. Skeptical hermeneutics argues that meanings occur at the intersection of signs and signs do not refer to objects in the world as positively defined or even to a positively defined subject. It is language itself that articulates the world and even articulates the presence of oneself to oneself, and it is language that is used to deconstruct or reinterpret other world views. Merleau-Ponty however does not travel this route, for when he abandons the idea of a flow of positive significations offered in reflective immanence to a positive cogito, he does not abandon a bodily self in contact with the world. For the late Merleau-Ponty the unitary body is still in contact with the perceptual world. This world of perceptual meanings or, more precisely, this world of meanings that is a product of the fusing of the active body and the world is the basis for reflective meaning expressed in language and thought. I hope to show that the structure of his late argument is similar in general outline to the structure of his earlier claims. This then will be the general structure of my paper: I will begin with a careful exposition of selected sections of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and then proceed to an analysis of the later *The Visible and the Invisible*. I will follow the arguments given by Bourgeois and others that there is a continuity between these two texts. With these well-established arguments as a background, I myself will attempt to show that the following can be found in both periods of Merleau-Ponty's development: 1.) a bodily openness to a perceptual world, 2.) a perceptual world that is shared by others, and 3.) that a shared perceptual world is taken up and sublimated in higher forms of linguistic expression. This continuity exists between Merleau-Ponty's early
and late work in spite of his criticism and abandonment of his earlier tacit cogito. The difference between the two periods does not lead Merleau-Ponty to abandon, as skeptical hermeneutics has, his earlier position that maintains that there is a perceptual contact with the world, a perceptual contact that acts as the founding term for more abstract, linguistic expression.

II

Throughout all of Merleau-Ponty's work (early and late) he attempts to find an alternative to the subject/object dichotomy and the exclusive methods and world views that it promulgates in the form of rationalism/idealism on the one hand and empiricism/materialism on the other. He attempts to show time and time again that the theoretical explanations provided by rationalism/idealism and empiricism/materialism fail and that the existential framework of being-in-the-world provides the appropriate explanations and the needed light. Merleau-Ponty's conception of being-in-the-world differs from both Sartre's and Heidegger's because of the central place he gives to the phenomenal or lived through body. It is in the lived, active body that the subject/object dichotomy is overcome. It is in lived through bodily action that the subject and the world combine in an inextricable blend. In the *Phenomenology of Perception* in the chapter on language, "The Body as Expression, and Speech," it will be observed once again that it is the concepts of rationalism and empiricism that Merleau-Ponty will argue against and a nonintellectual bodily intentionality that he will argue for. He opens the chapter on expression by claiming that "we have discovered in [the body]...intentionality and sense-giving power". "In trying to describe the phenomenon of speech and the specific act of meaning, we shall have the opportunity to leave behind...the traditional subject/object dichotomy."12

Merleau-Ponty first considers explanations from both sides of the subject/object dichotomy and then attempts to show that their attempted explanations fail and that his notion of bodily being-in-the-world or bodily intentionality explains what theirs cannot. He first considers, and only briefly, the empiricist's attempted explanation of language. The empiricist, he says, understands language as "'verbal images' or traces left in us by words spoken or heard," and understands the meanings of words as "given with the stimuli or with the states of consciousness which it is simply a matter of naming."13 Merleau-Ponty's objection to this approach is that it eliminates the speaking subject. The empiricist describes speech only as a third-person process. Merleau-Ponty argues against the empiricist's view by stating that "it is in the disturbance of thinking that the origin of certain forms of aphasia must be sought. For example, amnesia concerning names of colors...[reveals] a more general trouble." It is not that the patient "has lost the verbal image of the word red or blue, but that he has lost the general ability to subsume a sensory given under a category," for the patient is unable to sort different colors according to simple classifications. Merleau-Ponty thus concludes that language "appears to be conditioned by thought," by a
thinking subject, and this thinking subject is not taken account of in the empiricist's third-person
descriptions of language.\textsuperscript{14}

Even though this conclusion seems to situate the understanding of language in the rationalist
camp, Merleau-Ponty regards rationalism, or what he refers to as intellectualism, as forming a kinship
with empiricism, for "each holds that the word has no significance." We have just seen that for the
empiricist the word can have no meaning because the thinking subject plays no role in their description of
language. For the intellectualist the word has no significance "because it is only the external sign of an
internal recognition." "Thus," Merleau-Ponty says, "we refute both intellectualism and empiricism by
simply saying that the word has a meaning."\textsuperscript{15}

In a section entitled "Language Does Not Presuppose Thought, but Accomplishes It"\textsuperscript{16} Merleau-
Ponty offers the following arguments against intellectualism. First, if thought were somehow prior to and
independent of speech, why, asks Merleau-Ponty, would thought tend "toward expression as towards its
own completion." It seems that thought has not completed itself, that thought is not clear, or even clear to
itself, until it has found a means of expression. Thought \textit{is} expression, and a thought without language,
says Merleau-Ponty, would be almost nothing, like a fleet fainting spell.\textsuperscript{17} Secondly, the most familiar
objects appear vague and ambiguous until they have been named. For example, when I begin to
recognize a brush in a darkened room, I do not subsume this object under a general concept or category
and then link the object with a word that is associated with this category. The word "brush," the actual
naming of the object, bears the meaning of the object. The naming of the object, Merleau-Ponty says,
does not follow a conceptual recognition but is recognition itself.\textsuperscript{18} Third, Merleau-Ponty admits that it
sometimes appears "that consciousness can find in its experience only what it has itself put there." This
would mean however that communication is impossible, that another person's experience could not
communicate anything new to me. Merleau-Ponty agrees that "people can speak to us only a language
which we already understand but," he says, "these meanings sometimes combine to form a new thought
which recasts them all, and we are transported to the heart of the matter..." "There is, then, a taking up of
the others' thought through speech. Here the meaning of the words must finally be induced by the words
themselves, or...formed...from the gestural meaning which is immanent in speech." Merleau-Ponty can
only conclude from these three arguments that there must be a "thought in speech."\textsuperscript{19} These are Merleau-
Ponty's arguments against the intellectualist's claim that language is only an external vehicle for already
clearly worked-out thought. For Merleau-Ponty there is no thought without speech, or, more exactly,
thought occurs only through speech. He confirms this point in the subsequent section "Thoughts in
Words."\textsuperscript{20} Here Merleau-Ponty argues that the speaking subject neither represents his thought nor his
words to himself before speaking or even while speaking.
“Insofar as [words] persist within me, it is rather as does the Freudian Imago which is much less the representation of a former perception than a highly specific emotional essence, which is yet generalized, and detached from its origins. What remains to me of the word...is its style as constituted by its formation and sound.”

I do not represent a thought or a word to myself in reflection. Rather, the thought occurs in or through speech and speech persists in me as an emotional essence. Thus, "to know and pronounce [a word] ... it is enough that I possess its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the modulations, one of the possible uses of my body." 

In a section entitled "Thought is Expression" Merleau-Ponty offers further evidence that it is expression itself that brings meaning into existence and relates expression to communication with others. He says that just as in music "the meaning of a sonata is inseparable from the sound," so also thought is inseparable from its expression. When I consider communication with others, then, I must realize that I do not communicate with thoughts or representations that are behind the speech or the speaker. "I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in it. The gesture does not make me think anger, it is anger itself." Thus, when I communicate with another person, I communicate directly, through their gestures, with that person's intentions. 

Merleau-Ponty goes on to explain how this communication with others occurs.

"The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others. It is as if the other person's intention inhabited my body and mine his. The gesture which I witness outlines an intentional object. This object is genuinely present and fully comprehended when the powers of my body adjust themselves to it and overlap it."

This statement allows Merleau-Ponty to claim that "it is through my body that I understand other people ..." and that the meaning of the bodily gesture, of the bodily intentionality, "... is intermingled with the structures of the world outlined by the gesture."

Merleau-Ponty's arguments against empiricism and intellectualism have now taken shape and his own unique existential position is beginning to come into focus. The preceding passages reveal a rejection of empiricism because of its elimination of the speaking subject and a rejection of rationalism because of its reduction of language to a passive shell for an already clearly worked out and detached thought. The preceding passages also reveal Merleau-Ponty's position as one that focuses on the lived through act of a speaking or gesturing body subject and on a thought that occurs only in and through the
act of speech. For Merleau-Ponty the word or gesture itself possesses a meaning, and to know a word it is
enough to possess its acoustic or emotional style as one of the modulations of the body, as one of the
ways of bodily being-in-the-world. Furthermore, since a meaningful intention appears only by means of a
gesture, when I communicate with others, I communicate directly with an intention, not with an intention
behind the gesture but with the anger, for example, of the gesture itself. Communication with others thus
occurs through the human body, through a coupling or overlapping of gestures that aim meaningfully at a
world, at a world with which the body intermingles. Merleau-Ponty goes on to refine his existential
position by arguing that there are no conventional or objective signs. He claims first of all that
conventional relationships are established relatively late in the development of a language and human
culture and therefore do not take account of the origin and development of language. Secondly, he claims
that if one looks not at a word's intellectual meaning but at its emotional essence (as it is used in poetry,
for example), it is observed that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not completely
arbitrary. Yet, even though a word's meaning is not completely arbitrary, Merleau-Ponty does not believe
that words simply represent the world objectively. Rather, they express the sense that comes into
existence where the active body subject and the world meet. Words express the active body's emotional
encounter with the world. Words are so many ways, Merleau-Ponty says, of "singing the world's
praises." He thus concludes that there are no completely conventional or objective signs, that one must
"seek the first attempt at language in the emotional gesticulation whereby man superimposes on the given
world the world according to man."27

It can be clearly observed at this point in the presentation of Merleau-Ponty's early text that
language has its origin in the body's lived perceptual contact with the world, that the meaning of a gesture
is not arbitrary but expresses the human body's encounter with the world. However, Merleau-Ponty goes
on to say that just because the meaning of a gesture has its origin in an emotional encounter this does not
mean, as has sometimes been claimed, that all linguistic gestures can be reduced to natural signs and
emotional essences. There are no completely natural signs, he claims, since the body simply does not
produce a correspondence between states of mind and certain gestures.28 The emotional experience of
anger, for example, does not necessarily give rise to a reddening of the face and the stamping of the foot,
as is characteristic of the westerner. When experiencing the same emotion, the Japanese becomes
extremely quiet and even more polite.29 It is true that the body offers certain propensities or inclinations
 toward certain typical forms of behavior, but it is also true that it leaves open the possibility for a great
deal of variety. For Merleau-Ponty, then, expressions are both natural and created. "There is not a word
not a form of behavior which does not owe something to purely biological being - and which at the same
time does not elude the simplicity of animal life." "Behavior creates meanings which are transcendent in
relation to anatomical apparatus, and yet immanent to the behavior as such.\textsuperscript{30} Thus language has its origin in lived through emotional contact with the environment but it is also capable of transcending the original biological situation, of opening new meanings.

Merleau-Ponty goes on to link this ability to transcend the biological to the body's ability to communicate with others.

“... the human body is defined in terms of its property of appropriating ... significant cores which transcend and transfigure its natural powers. The act of transcendence is first encountered in the acquisition of a pattern of behavior, then in the mute communication of gestures.”\textsuperscript{31}

Merleau-Ponty cites as an example of the ability of the body to transfigure its own natural or biological powers how the "knitting of the brows intended ... to protect the eyes from the sun, or the narrowing of the eyes to enable one to see sharply, become component parts of the act of meditation, and convey this to the observer."\textsuperscript{32} Or, as an example of the body's ability to appropriate significant cores and to transfigure its natural powers, one might imagine a child witnessing an adult performing some action, say gesturing in anger with a clinched fist, and spontaneously taking up this action without completely understanding it. The child is able to shake its fist as the adult does, is able to go through the motions of this gesture, is able to appropriate this gesture without completely grasping its meaning. Yet, as the child matures, he or she too (perhaps unfortunately) will clearly understand the symbolic or figurative meaning of such a gesture. Thus the child displays the ability to appropriate meaningful gestures that transcend the body's natural functions.

“What then,” one may ask, “does language express” if it has the ability to transcend the body's natural powers of expression?

“[Language] presents or rather is the subject's taking up of a position in the world of meanings. The term 'world' here is not a manner of speaking: it means that the mental or cultural life burrows its structures from natural life and that this thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate. The phonetic 'gesture' brings about both for the speaking subject and for his hearers, a certain structural coordination of experience, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behavior endows the objects around me with a certain signification both for me and for others.”\textsuperscript{33}

Language then is a certain phonetic gesture, "a contraction of the throat, ... a certain way of bringing the body into play [that] suddenly allows itself to be invested with a figurative significance."\textsuperscript{34} Linguistic
gestures however could not express a new or figurative meaning if a cultural setting of available
significations did not already exist. Just as the bodily gesture needs, in order to communicate, a
perceptual world that is common to all, so also the linguistic gesture needs a cultural setting of shared
meanings. However, to carry the analogy even further, just as the bodily gesture invests its surroundings
for the first time with a human meaning, if it is an original gesture, so also the original linguistic gesture
can transform the already available significations.35 “We must therefore recognize as an ultimate fact this
open and indefinite power of giving significance ... by which man transcends himself towards a new form
of behavior or towards other people or towards his own thought through his body and his speech.” But
we must also recognize that in order to do so, in order to transcend himself toward a new form of
behavior, others, or toward his own thought, that he does so only through the body and only by travelling
along paths already established by the body and its perceptual contact with the world.

To summarize, Merleau-Ponty attempts to come between empiricism and intellectualism in the
understanding of speech, which he now conceives as the intentional body's way of linguistically being-in-
the-world. Merleau-Ponty has rejected empiricism, which reduced language to a third-person objective
process and did not take the speaking subject into account. He rejects this position by showing that
certain forms aphasia can only be understood by a disturbance of thought. He has rejected
intellectualism, which understands language as an empty shell for prior, independent thought. He rejects
this position because conceptual distinctions are preceded by bodily orientations, and because thought
itself only occurs in or through the bodily orientation called speech. In articulating his own position, he
claims that in lived through action the body subject meets and blends with the world, where the two meet
meanings are formed. The first attempts at language must therefore be sought in the gesticulation that is a
prolongation of the active body's interaction with the world. The speaking subject's power to express
must therefore be seen in the body’s ability to take up and prolong the gestures that aim at the world.
Expression itself at first focuses on emotional essences and the emotional encounter with the world.
Where the emotional, active, creative body subject meets the world, there meanings are formed. These
emotional meanings stream through and across the body in the form of gestures. These gestures can
overlap with the gestures of others and with their world. Merleau-Ponty claims that the individual's
perceptual experience opens to an anonymous or shared perceptual field, but he also realized that it has
often been said that this is impossible, that one person cannot experience another person's experience.
Merleau-Ponty counters by arguing that this is not true.37 If I understand consciousness not as a private
awareness of the contents of my own mind but as a relation to the world, as being out of itself at the
object (like a search light), if I see that consciousnesses meet or overlap at the thing, then it is possible for
me to share experience with others. I can live my bodily relationship to the world, I can emotionally sing
or gesture its praises, then others will be able to grasp these gestures because they will stream through and across their own bodies, and because the gestures aim at a shared perceptual world. These lived through meanings (at first emotional essences) may then become detached from the original experience and sedimented in the body in the form of gestural habits that become available significations for further expression. The bodily gestures which open upon a shared world give rise to and are the model for the new verbal gestures (also bodily) which in turn become available for new expressions, since creative verbal expressions are able to rearrange the available significations and are thus able to arrange or secret a new meaning. Bodily gestures that open to a shared perceptual world give rise to verbal gestures that open a new world of shared cultural meanings. Thus, in the early writings one finds that 1.) the body subject opens onto a perceptual world which is shared and because gestures overlap and interpenetrate. And finally, one finds that 3.) the world of shared perceptual meanings acts as the basis upon which rests the world of linguistic meanings.

Before I move on to attempt to find these three elements in Merleau-Ponty's late writings one more crucial chapter of the Phenomenology of Perception remains to be investigated, "The Cogito," and especially the section of this chapter called "The Tacit Cogito and the Verbal Cogito." Here Merleau-Ponty argues, as I briefly indicated in the introduction above, that there is a consciousness of oneself that "makes use of language." For example, by following the words of Descartes arguments, "I reach the conclusion that indeed because I think, therefore I am; but this is merely a verbal cogito, for I have grasped my thought and my existence only through language." However, Merleau-Ponty goes on to say, "I should find [words] ... meaningless ..., were I not, before any speech can begin, in contact with my own life and thought ..." Thus, even though there is a cogito that is dependent on language for its expression, Merleau-Ponty also claims that language presupposes a consciousness of language. As was observed above, words take on their first meanings for Merleau-Ponty when the subject, as a bodily project or intention, comes in contact with the world, where these two meet meanings are formed. Here the subject is a tacit cogito (a non-thematic awareness of oneself in contact with the world) that is taken to be prior to language and philosophy. Consciousness, albeit a consciousness that is nothing other than a relation to the world, is required for perception and language to have any meaning or sense. On the other hand, "what is believed to be thought about thought, as pure feeling of self, cannot yet be thought and needs to be revealed." The tacit cogito needs to be revealed by language and philosophy. In his later work Merleau-Ponty says that this is impossible: there can be no thought about thought which is not yet thought. This is impossible because thought requires language. From the perspective of the late work, then, there is no nonlinguistic cogito prior to language and upon which language rests. Consequently,
there is no flow of positive significations that are immediately and completely given to a private cogito. To make the reduction, says Merleau-Ponty, or the return to immanence and the consciousness of ..., to positive, categorically defined meanings, it is necessary to have words.43

Consequently, one is not arriving at a flow of meanings that is absolutely self-given and completely transparent to consciousness. These meanings are dependent upon language, which is a cultural phenomenon and thus a carrier of already constituted meanings and assumptions. Yet, as will soon be observed in The Visible and the Invisible, for Merleau-Ponty the perceived still provides an order where there are nonlinguistic significations.44 In spite of the differences just noted, this is one important way that the early and late works remain the same. In The Visible and the Invisible, as in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty still wants to describe the structures of the perceptual field.45 However, in the later works Merleau-Ponty eliminates the tacit cogito, the cogito which brought about the consciousness of self, consciousness of the word, and consciousness of the world. He says as early as The Structure of Behavior that perception is not just a cluster of data but involves consciousness or awareness of that data. Perception involves a non-thetic awareness of oneself. Without this awareness, experience would collapse into the object and there would be no experience. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty abandons the non-thetic awareness of oneself, the implied reflection or self-awareness as an I think, for the reflexivity of the body. The body is aware of the world because the world is rebounding on it, because the body is aware of itself. The body can touch/see because it is touched/seen. Where this chiasm comes together, a visibility or a tactile in general is formed. Thus the reflexivity of the body gives rise to the visual/tactile field, to a visual/tactile field that Merleau-Ponty seeks to describe and that will provide the basis for linguistic expression and abstract thought.

In the later work, Merleau-Ponty will also try to explain precisely how the relation between the body and the visual field gives rise to the relation between the body and the ideal field. The tacit cogito of the Phenomenology of Perception (or any positively defined self) could not explain this46 for it presupposed a positive, thinking subject opening onto a field of positive (and therefore conceptual) meanings. In the later work in a clear departure from the early text Merleau-Ponty does not want to start with a thinking subject -- even if it is a tacit one -- but with a bodily self which is defined as an absence, as a negative being-at, as dimensional, oppositional, as a hinge or gap between the body as seer and as seen. These terms will be explained in detail below. For now it is enough to see that the reflexivity of the body, the structural gap between the body as seer and as seen, is where a structural, oppositional experience (rather than the positive experience of the early text) is born. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty will explain how this experience will then sublimate into the oppositional structures of language and thought.
It should be noted here that this dimensional bodily experience of the later text is both personal and general, both private and anonymous. My own body experienced from the inside, my body and its perceptual functions open to a field that is prior to and includes it. As Jacques Taminiaux has convincingly argued, this part of Merleau-Ponty's later description of experience is not new.\(^47\) This middle ground between rationalism and empiricism, this blend of the subjective and objective in the body, this opening of one's own experience to an already given perceptual field that includes one's experience is not new to *The Visible and the Invisible*. It may be expressed more completely, more radically and without Cartesian remnants, but it is not new. This lived through bodily experience, this lived through blend of the subjective and objective, of the personal and general, this chiasm of the toucher and touched is what Merleau-Ponty calls the flesh in the later text. It is that out of which comes the subjective and objective, the body as toucher and touched. The flesh has an anonymous, prepersonal side, out of which my experience arises, of which my experience is a part, but it also has a personal side, for the flesh could not be experienced without the flesh of my body. Thus, in abandoning the tacit cogito, Merleau-Ponty does not abandon a phenomenological description of experience. Without the experience of the lived through body, there would be no experience of the flesh. And without Merleau-Ponty's description of the lived through body, there would be no description of the flesh, even though the flesh is that which is prior to and includes this experience.

I will now carefully consider Merleau-Ponty's *Visible and the Invisible* and look for the themes that also appeared in the earlier work: 1.) for a bodily experience that opens to an anonymous visible, 2.) for gestures that overlap and interpenetrate, and 3.) for the sublimation of perceptual contact into bodily gestures and bodily gestures into phonetic and linguistic ones. The differences between the early and late work should also be kept in mind however. In *The Visible and the Invisible* I will therefore look for a visual field that is more explicitly oppositional and for how the positive tacit cogito of the *Phenomenology of Perception* is replaced by the negative, reflexive body.

III.

Merleau-Ponty begins the final pages of *The Visible and the Invisible* by considering the following questions: what is the visible and why is it that the visible seems to rest in itself, and yet, at the same time, be the correlative of my vision.\(^48\) Merleau-Ponty has argued in both *The Structure of Behavior* and *The Phenomenology of Perception* that the simplest element of perception is not an isolated sense datum but a figure on a background. Here, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, he uses a much more metaphorical language to make the same point. The visible "...is a certain node in the woof of the simultaneous and successive." "Between the alleged colors and visible, we find anew the tissue that links them, sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, and
a flesh of the things." Between the visible things one finds invisible lines of force that help articulate and present the perceptual. If there is a difference between the earlier works and the present text, it is that Merleau-Ponty now focuses on the invisible lines of force that help articulate the visual field rather than the articulated field itself. Or, more exactly, he highlights the invisible, dimensional elements as the necessary other side of the articulated visible.

Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that this sort of latency and hiddenness also applies to the seer. The carnal or bodily being that the seer is implies "...a being or several leaves..., a being in latency, and a presentation of a certain absence." The carnal seer "...is a prototype of Being, of which our body ... is a very remarkable variant..." Since the visible ... is always ... between the aspects we see of it, there is access to it only through an experience which, like it, is wholly outside of itself. It is thus, and not as the bearer of a knowing subject, that our body commands the visible for us...

Here the difference between the earlier work and the later text is most evident, for here one observes that a positive, tacit cogito has been replaced by a negative, dimensional body. The body as self experiences itself only by being at the thing, only by being the other side of the visible, the negative that is only the revealing of the visible.

This initial sketch of Merleau-Ponty's view of the visible and the seer now allows a consideration of the relationship between them. Merleau-Ponty's investigation of this relationship proceeds with an analysis of touch, for he argues that the relation between the questioner and the questioned is closer here than they are between vision and the visible. "How does it happen," he asks, "that the movement of my hand is able to feel the textures of the sleek and the rough?" In order to have a tactile experience my hand must feel from the inside, as it moves across a surface, but in order for this to take place the hand must be capable of being touched from the outside. In order for the hand to touch it must be capable of being touched. There is a reversibility or a chiasm that is present here that must be grasped in order to understand this simple yet fundamental experience of tactile sensation. In order for the hand to be able to feel from the inside it must "pass over into the ranks of the touched"; it must descend "into the things." Moreover "it is no different for the vision ..." For "... he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it ..."

It is thus that Merleau-Ponty outlines his first provisional answers to the questions we began with above: What is a visible and "how does it happen that my look enveloping them, does not hide them, and, finally, that veiling them, it unveils them?" "It is the body and it alone, because it is a two-dimensional being, that can bring us to the things themselves ..." However, "the body interposed is not itself a thing... but a sensible for itself, which means ... a set of colors and surfaces inhabited by a touch, a vision, hence an exemplar sensible, which offers to him who inhabits it and senses it the wherewithal to sense everything that resembles it on the outside ..."
As has already been noted, what Merleau-Ponty tries to accomplish in all of his theoretical works, yet here even more radically, is to come between the epistemological alternatives of empiricism and rationalism. It is the lived through bodily experience, in which the toucher and the touched are bound together, that Merleau-Ponty seeks to describe. In fact, he is really attempting to develop an ontology of lived experience, for he argues that this lived through blend of the toucher and the touched is the starting point from which one must try to understand the toucher and the touched respectively, is the starting point from which one must try to understand what they are. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's alternative to traditional ontology and epistemology involves describing that which precedes the subjective/objective distinction, that out of which they arise.

What is important here with regard to skeptical hermeneutics is that it can be seen immediately that Merleau-Ponty places the seer in the seen, touching in the touched. In order to feel, I must be corporeal, and my sensing involves an intimate (sensual) contact with a world that is really there. The toucher touches (senses) the world, has a tactile experience of it, has a conscious or, rather, a precognitive experience which is nonrepresentational, since it is lived through. Consciousness is not reduced to matter, to neurons firing, nor is it to be thought of as an isolated intellectual cogito, an isolated "little man inside the man," staring at an intellectually fixed picture or a representation of the world. Consciousness is now defined as prereflective bodily awareness. It is a lived through relation to the world. It is out of itself in the world. The human body is in the world and open on to it, i.e., in perceptual contact with it. This perceptual contact can then be sublimated into language and expression -- which is a claim that skeptical hermeneutics denies or at least attempts to undermine, for its proponents argue that there is nothing outside of linguistic expression, that linguistic expression must be seen as prior to and articulating what is supposedly given.

Let us look at Merleau-Ponty's concept of bodily openness to the world more carefully. Merleau-Ponty argues that experience does not occur just anywhere. The tactile, for example, occurs within me, within my body, for I feel my hand from the inside, yet a contribution is made to the tactile from the outside. And these experiences blend. I am not sure where the toucher ends and being touched begins. There is a blend of me (the feeler, toucher, touching) and that which is not me (the felt, touched, being touched). The touch is felt within me but also extends beyond me. The tactile (an experience) brings together the feeler (the experiencer) with the felt (the object) in such a way that I cannot distinguish between them. The tactile experience has a subjective side but also a general side, the tactile extends beyond the toucher and includes him or her. Thus there is an anonymous, prepersonal character to bodily experience. There is the tactile in general or the visible in general of which I am a part. My experience opens to a world that runs beyond me and includes me.
Just as was observed in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, it can be observed here that since there is an element of generality to experience, since there is an element of experience that does not belong just to me as an isolated subject, there is, consequently, a possibility of sharing experience with others. Merleau-Ponty's analysis pursues this line of thinking further. For, he says, if I can understand how visibility arises in me, how this "coiling over of the visible upon the visible" traverses me, then I can understand how it occurs in bodies other than my own.\(^63\)

How does this visibility arise in me? Let us follow Merleau-Ponty's analysis of tactile experience further. If my right hand can touch my left hand touching, and if there is a reversibility of the two, then why is it that I cannot find this same power to be the toucher, in the other, when I touch the other's hand?\(^64\) It is said that the process of touching my hand touching, the reversibility of the touching and touched hand, is a process that occurs within me, and the problem is to give rise to another's experience.\(^65\) But how is it that the experiences within me blend, how is it that touching and being touched occurs within the same hand? How is it that the different tactile or visual experiences blend together and are unified? The problem of the unity of experience is overcome if one realizes that the perspectives blend together because they occur in one sole body.\(^66\) The different tactile experiences that I have with my two hands or with the same hand blend together not because of a series of reflective judgments but because of the lived through unity of the body. My perspectives blend because my perception is a prepersonal bodily awareness open prereflectively to the world. My experiences blend because they are the experiences of one sole body before one sole world. The generality of experience thus appears once again; one perspective blends with the others because they overlap in the body and each speaks the other's language, because each aims at a common world.

This is, then, along with the touching/touched, seer/seen experience that was just considered above, the way that the tactile and the visible arise and are unified in the body. I have now grasped, says Merleau-Ponty, the principle by which the tactile and visible arise in me and my body, and he proceeds to ask: "Why, then, would this generality, which constitutes the unity of my body, not open to other bodies? Why would not the synergy exist among different organisms, if it is possible within each?"\(^67\) But, he continues, the objection is still raised that the experiences that are given to others are a mystery for me.\(^68\) Merleau-Ponty responds to this objection.

"This is not completely true; for me not to have an idea, nor an image, nor a representation, but as it were the imminent experience of them, it suffices that I look at a landscape, that I speak of it to someone. Then, through the concordant operation of his body, and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green of the meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my green his green ..."\(^69\)
“There is no problem with the alter ego, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general.”70

For Merleau-Ponty, not only do I experience the world, I experience a world that is experienced and shared by others. My experience opens to a world, to an experience that is other than mine alone. My experience is thus cut out of, as Merleau-Ponty says, a total voluminosity which surrounds me. Because of the body there is a prepersonal, anonymous generality to experience, an experience of which I and the other can take part. This is similar to what Merleau-Ponty developed in his earlier writings. In both works one observes that the body opens onto a visible world that is shared by all. In both works one also observes that there is a gestural overlapping that further makes possible the communication of one human organism with another. As Merleau-Ponty says here in The Visible and the Invisible:

“There is a circle of the touched and the touching, the visible and the seeing. There is an inscription of the touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible - and the converse.”

“There is a propagation of these exchanges to all the bodies of the same type or style which I see and touch - and this by virtue of the fundamental fission of sentient and the sensible which, laterally, makes the organs of my body communicate and founds transitivity from one body to another.”71

There is thus an overlap of bodily styles, of gestures or of the way of bodily being-in-the-world. Here in the late work, as well as in the Phenomenology of Perception, this overlap or this transitivity of behavior styles from one body to another, along with the openness onto the same visible world, literally makes communication with others possible. Genuine communication with others, a genuine blending of landscapes is made "possible as soon as we no longer make belongingness to one same 'consciousness' the primordial definition of sensibility."72 The sensible is now to be defined as the return of the tactile upon itself, the return of the visible upon itself. Thus, the visible is not constituted by me but is constituted in and through me by the return of the visible on itself. This occurs in others as well as in me. Consequently, each human being is an example of the appearance of the visible to itself.

Here in The Visible and the Invisible I have tried to point out some of the general themes that were also found in Merleau-Ponty's earlier work. 1.) One can find the same openness of the body onto the visible world, or, more precisely, one can find the same creation of the visible out of the composite of the active body and its natural environment. One finds the same openness to an anonymous visual field that runs beyond and includes the perceiver. 2.) One also finds a slippage of the visible into the tactile and visa versa, a synergy between the different functions of the body, and a synergy between one body and another. Since there is a transitive relation between one body and another, gestures overlap and
intermingle with the same shared world. One difference that can be perceived is that Merleau-Ponty no longer relies on the concept of the tacit cogito (belongingness to one same consciousness) to define sensibility and visibility. It is the body, the folding over of nature on itself through the human body, that creates the sensible, not the awareness of the tacit cogito. In contradistinction to skeptical hermeneutics, in the working notes of an unfinished text Merleau-Ponty has sketched the groundwork for knowledge claims, claims about the world that others can share and hopefully corroborate. But, in order to establish knowledge properly speaking, he must also introduce thought and language; he must connect the lived through, prereflective sensual contact with reflective thought and language, and he must make the relationship to others more explicit. This is what he attempts to do in the closing pages of *The Visible and the Invisible*.

Merleau-Ponty claims that as soon as human beings see other seers, from then on, through the eyes of the other, they are themselves fully visible. For the first time the body is fascinated by the possibility of coupling itself with another being, "of making itself the outside of its inside, and the inside of its outside." For the first time the possibility of genuine communication has come into being.\(^73\) The reversibility of the flesh spoken of above also occurs in language. Just as there is a reflexivity of the touching and the touched, just as the toucher is simultaneously touched, there is likewise a reflexivity of phonation and of hearing, the speaker hears his speech.\(^74\) "This reversibility and the emergence of the flesh as expression are the point of insertion of speaking and thinking in the world of silence."\(^75\)

“At the frontier of the mute or solipsist world where, in the presence of other seers, my visible is confirmed as an exemplar of a universal visibility, we reach a second or figurative meaning of vision, which will be the *intuitus mentis* or idea, a sublimation of the flesh, which will be mind or thought. But the factual presence of the other bodies could not produce thought or the idea if the seeds were not in my own body. Thought is a relationship with oneself and the world as well as a relationship with the other; hence it is established in the three dimensions at the same time."\(^76\)

For Merleau-Ponty my lived, prereflective contact with the world is articulated through a reflection on the prereflective. The seeds of this articulation are present prior to the presence of the other, for how could the mere presence of the other bring about self-awareness and awareness of the world? How could it create these awarenesses if they were not in some way prefigured in the human body? Yet the presence of the other helps complete the process. The presence of the other helps complete one's reflection on oneself and the world, a reflection that has its foundation in the reflexivity of the body. Here one is offered a glimpse of what Merleau-Ponty might say to representatives of skeptical hermeneutics: language and the other do not create, *ex nihilo*, the "presence" of the world's objects and the "presence" of
the self. Language and the other help articulate what is there, but something must be there for language to articulate. Meanings are not the sole creation of linguistic systems. Merleau-Ponty's analysis is, I believe, superior to the hermeneutic position because it displays the origins of language, thought and meaning in human body's prereflective contact with the world.\textsuperscript{77}

With the introduction of the sublimation of the prereflective, Merleau-Ponty has now established the three dimensions that are required to establish knowledge and thought: the relationship between oneself and the world (between the seer and the seen), the relationship between oneself and others, and the relationship between oneself and oneself (between the prereflective and the reflective). The relationship between the seer and the seen is characterized by the reversibility of the body: the toucher or seer is touched and seen. The seer is immediately a carnal being, is immediately in a world of objects that resemble it, and opens onto a world of objects that are members of its family. The visual field and perceptual meanings are formed where the bodily seer intermingles with its world. This claim, as has been observed, bears some similarity to the earlier work. The relationship between myself and others is characterized by the generality of experience. The anonymous visible upon which I open with a body that is in part anonymous is open to other seers and other bodies. Subsequently, the possibility of shared experience becomes a reality. What I see, the visible upon which I open, passes into the other because this visible is an anonymous visible of which we are both a part and because of the synergy of our bodies. Our gestures overlap. When I truly recognize the other as another person, then, for the first time, my visible becomes an example of the visibility in general. This last insight helps in the attempt to understand the genesis of abstract thought, but the relationship between the prereflective and reflective thought and language is, as Merleau-Ponty states, the most difficult to clarify.\textsuperscript{78}

Recall that for Merleau-Ponty the visible is a gestalt, a figure on a background, within which the visible is supported by an "interior armature," an armature which the visible "manifests and which it conceals." All the elements of the gestalt are required to fully understand the perceptual, including the reciprocal relations that the parts of the visual field have on each other. The elements of the perceptual, and the relations between them, cannot simply be added up to create the perceptual whole. The perceptual whole is an original whole in which the parts are what they are because of the lines of force between them. These lines of force, these rays or relations, are not themselves visible. They are the other side of the visible, that which helps articulate the visible. Thus within the prereflective contact with the world, the visible is supported by an interior armature, an armature that is described by Merleau-Ponty as an idea that is not the contrary of the sensible but its lining and depth.\textsuperscript{79} The difficulty, however, is moving from this lived perceptual ideality to the reflective ideality of thought and language. Merleau-Ponty attempts to resolve this difficulty.
“However we finally have to understand it, the "pure" ideality already streams forth along the articulations of the aesthesiological body, along the contours of the sensible things.”

“When silent vision falls into speech, and when speech in turn ... metamorphoses the structures of the whole world and makes itself a gaze of the mind, intuitus mentis - this is always in virtue of the same fundamental phenomena of reversibility which sustains both mute perception and the speech and which manifests itself by an almost carnal existence of the idea, as well as by a sublimation of the flesh.”

Merleau-Ponty begins (and only begins, for these pages were literally some of the last he wrote before he died) to clarify the third dimension required for knowledge, the relationship between the prereflective sensual contact with the world and abstract thought and language. Within the original lived through contact with the world, where the subjective and the objective blend together, where the form and content of that which is perceived are indistinguishable, the "idea" is the lining and depth of the sensible. Language and thought are a more abstract expression of this primordial lining. "It is as though the visibility that animates the sensible world were to emigrate, not outside of every body, but into another less heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and thereby would be emancipated but not freed from every condition." One can clearly see from the preceding remarks that Merleau-Ponty sublimes the perceptual into the world of ideal meanings, that linguistic meanings and expressions rest upon a foundation of perceptual structure. Merleau-Ponty is clearly not skeptical with regard to knowledge about our visual world. Nor would he accept the present emphasis of skeptical hermeneutics on linguistic or interpretive systems which create their own world of meaning. Language is not just about itself, nor is it cut off from perceptual contact with the world. Language is a sublimation of lived perceptual contact with the world. Language and thought are in contact with the world, and they are in contact with a world that is shared by others.

I have now touched upon the main points of comparison and difference between Merleau-Ponty's early and late work that I promised I would discuss. In both the early and later works Merleau-Ponty argues that 1.) the body opens onto a visible world that is shared by all. In both periods he argues that 2.) human gestures interpenetrate, thus making genuine communication possible, and in both periods, he claims that 3.) the visual field that is already structured by the body/world interaction provides the basis for more abstract linguistic expression. The later work however is much more radical in its attempt to overcome the subject/object dichotomy and to leave behind the few remaining elements of Cartesianism still found in the Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty succeeds in doing this by replacing the tacit cogito with the reflexive body. Merleau-Ponty states that it is in the reflexivity of the body, in the
chiasm of touching with being touched, that human experience is born. He articulates this overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy in an even more radical way when he states that in the reflexivity of nature, in the folding back of nature on itself, a folding back that brings nature to itself, makes it aware of itself - experience is born. Here Merleau-Ponty ontologically grounds phenomenology. The folding over on itself of nature, the reflection back to itself through the human body, is the creation of experience, of nature's experience of itself. Nature experiences itself through the human body. Thus phenomenology is not psychology; it is not the description of the contents of the consciousness of an isolated cogito, as might be claimed about the descriptions of the *Phenomenology of Perception*. Phenomenology has become ontology because it reveals through the description of bodily experience the very structure of nature; it reveals the ontological structures that produce experience: the folding over of nature through the human body on itself. As has been observed, this experience is dimensional and oppositional, just as the human body is itself dimensional and oppositional. The body, for Merleau-Ponty, is not to be seen as a positive thing or as a positive cogito. The body is a thing but it is also lived through; it is the thing that gives us access to all other things. The body as self must be seen as a negative being-at. The body experiences itself only by being out of itself; it can touch only by being touched. The body as self is thus between being seer and being seen. The body as self is the splitting open of the body into seer/seen (a fission that is also a fusion, for the seeing and being seen occurs in one place, in one body, and different experiences blend together and cohere). This dimensional/oppositional body is thus related to the world in a dimensional/oppositional way (because it is of the world and like it), and the interaction between them gives rise to a dimensional/oppositional language, to a language that is a sublimation of the dimensional world.

However, even though Merleau-Ponty claims that language is a sublimation of the visible, he does admit that

“... language as well as music can sustain a sense by virtue of its own arrangement ... Why not admit that, just as musical notation is a facsimile made after the event ... language as a system of explicit relations ... is a result and a product of the operative language ... This does not mean that the musical notation and grammar and linguistics, and the ‘ideas of intelligence’ ... are useless; it means that the system of objective relations, the acquired ideas, are themselves caught up in something like a second life and perception, which make the mathematician go straight to entities no one has yet seen, make the operative language and the algorithm make use of a second visibility, and make ideas be the other side of language. When I think they animate my interior speech ... and they remain beyond the words ... because they are that certain divergence, that openness ever to be
In order to completely understand Merleau-Ponty's later theory of language, there is a final series of parallels that the above passage touches upon that must be further clarified. First, the touching/touched structure of the body, this splitting open and yet cohesion of the body, is the means through which humans experience the world and the world experiences itself. The touching/touched structure has a gap in it, a hinge (since I am unable to touch myself touching, I am unable to make the touched and the touching completely coincide). Around this gap pivots clear zones, the body as seer and the body as seen. These articulated zones are given only against the background of a hiddenness, the gap between them. In the same way, since they are the same, the visual field is experienced as horizontal, as dimensional, as having hidden or invisible gestalt dimensions that help articulate what is visible.

Furthermore, just as visual/perceptual meaning (the perceptual idea) is the result of the coming together of oppositional and structural elements in the visual field, just as the visual/perceptual meaning is formed at the intersection of the elements and is between them, so also linguistic meaning (the abstract idea) is the result of the coming together of oppositional and structural elements in the linguistic field. Linguistic meaning is formed at the intersection of these elements and is between them. The structures of language must, after all, be similar to the structures of the perceptual field - for it is its sublimation.

In addition, just as the invisible is the other side of the visible, is the coherence of the visible elements, their streaming together, so also ideas are the other side of language. Ideas as meanings are the coherence of the words, their streaming together. Just as there is a sense or an invisible that is "behind" the visible (between the visible elements) that helps make it what it is, so there is a sense or invisible behind words that helps make them what they are. Or, more precisely, the organization of the words is their sense, and, as has just been observed, the organization of words can sustain their own sense. The operative expression opens a field of significations but these in turn are able to guide the operative expression. Operative language sublimates the visual field into a linguistic field that can sustain its own sense, a sense that can rebound upon its own means of expression. M. C. Dillon's discussion of Merleau-Ponty's use of *fundierung* as a founding term is very helpful here. As Dillon remarks, the visual field is for Merleau-Ponty the founding term, the field that the linguistic field is a sublimation of and upon which it rests. Yet the founded term, linguistic expression, rebounds upon the visual field and helps articulate it. Just as there is a chiasm between the body and the world, there is a chiasm (this time, as Dillon points out, an asymmetrical one) between the operative expression and the field of linguistic signification that it opens. Thus, one can finally grasp what Merleau-Ponty believes to be the relationship between the prereflective visual field and abstract thought and expression. The visual field is founding term for the
field of linguistic significations which exist in a chiasmatic relationship with the field upon which it rests.

Endnotes


3. For a partial listing of some of these interpretations see James Schmidt's *Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 9.


7. I will follow Bourgeois and others but focus more exclusively on language and on a detailed comparison between *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*. I do this because one of my reasons for undertaking this article is to provide in essay length an introduction to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language. I wish to do this at a level of abstraction that will do justice to the detail and richness of Merleau-Ponty's thought and yet will provide a convenient summary of a complex topic and a complex thinker.


10. See Jacques Derrida's "Differance" in *Speech and Phenomena* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) particularly pp., 139ff, where he discusses Saussure's interpretation of language as a system of differences; pp., 145-147, where he discusses the subject as a function of language; pp. 152-155, where he discusses presence as a function of language.

11. See A. De Waelhens' forward to Merleau-Ponty's *The Structure of Behavior*, pp. xviii-xxvii


13. Ph.P., p. 175

14. Ph.P., p. 176

15. Ph.P., pp. 176-177

16. Ph.P., p. 177. This section title comes at line 1 of the first full paragraph on p. 177 of the English translation. For some reason the translator chose not to include these subheadings in the English translation. For a complete list of these very helpful subheadings and their location in the English translation see Samuel Mallin's *Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp., 277-286

17. Ph.P., p. 177

18. Ph.P., pp. 177-178


20. Ph.P., p. 179, line 1 of the first full paragraph.


22. Ph.P., p. 180

23. Ph.P., p. 181, line 1 of the first full paragraph.

24. Ph.P., pp. 182-183

25. Ph.P., p. 185

26. Ph.P., p. 186

27. Ph.P., pp. 187-188

28. Ph.P., pp. 188-189

29. Ph.P., p. 189

30. Ph.P., p. 189

31. Ph.P., p. 193
32. Ph.P., p. 194
33. Ph.P., p. 193
34. Ph.P., p. 194
35. Ph.P., p. 193
36. Ph.P., p. 193
37. Ph.P., p. 405
38. Ph.P., p. 400, line 1 of the first full paragraph.
39. Ph.P., p. 400
40. Ph.P., p. 402
41. Ph.P., p. 403
42. Ph.P., p. 404
43. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 171. Henceforth cited as VI.
44. VI, p. 171
45. VI, p. 171
46. VI, pp. 175-176
47. Tamineaux, op. cit., pp. 307-312
48. VI, pp. 130-131
49. VI, pp. 132-133
50. VI, p. 133
51. VI, p. 136
52. VI, p. 136
53. VI, p. 133
54. VI, p. 133
77. Dillon also makes this point, although my insight was arrived at independently of his. See Dillon's *Merleau-Ponty's Ontology*, pp. 194 ff.
78. VI, p. 149
79. VI, p. 149
80. VI, p. 152
81. VI, pp. 154-155; See also p. 213.
82. VI, p. 153
83. VI, p. 45; see also Merleau-Ponty's "Indirect Language and Voices of Silence" in Signs, trans., R. Mc Cleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 80-81; and The Prose of the World, pp. 102-103
84. VI, p. 153
85. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, pp. 194 ff.